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1 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
MRS. HERMAN FOSTER and 
JOHN EWING, natural parents 
of Jeffrey Adrian Ewing, 
aka Jeffrey Ewing Foster, 
~ceased, a minor, and 
DAVID MAC KELLY, 
Plaintiffs-Respondents, 
vs. 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, a body 
corporate and politic of 
the State of Utah, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
No. 
Plaintiffs' claim of recovery in this case is based 
upon the theory that Salt Lake County is an "implied insurer" 
of employees driving Salt Lake County vehicles even though 
not within the course and scope of their employment. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The trial court granted a Motion for Summary Judgment 
on behalf of the plaintiffs and against the defendant in the 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
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amount of $150,000.00, plus attorneys' fees in the amount 
of $1,015.00. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant seeks reversal of the Summary Judgment 
entered by the trial court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Prior to July 1st, 1977, Salt Lake County's vehicles 
were insured by a commercial insurance company. On June 13, 
1977, the Salt Lake County Commission voted to investigate 
a self-insurance program. On June 27th Salt Lake County 
applied to the Insurance Commissioner for a Certificate of 
Self-Insurance, pursuant to the Automobile No Fault Insur-
ance Act. The Certificate of Self-Insurance was issued on 
the 7th of July, 1977. Consequently, the commercial insur-
ance was discontinued. 
The policy of the Salt Lake County Sheriff's Office is 
to allow Deputy Sheriffs to use County vehicles strictly in 
accordance with the following conditions: (1) The vehicle 
be used only within Salt Lake County; (2) The vehicle not be 
used after a Deputy has consumed liquor; (3) The vehicle is 
not to be used to travel to and from an outside job; (4) ~e 
vehicle is not to be used while unauthorized passengers are 
riding in the vehicle; (5) The Deputy Sheriff keep his r~~ 
on and be available to respond to burglaries in progress, 
robberies in progress, homicides and similar crimes in the 
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near vicinity. In order for an off-duty officer to go on-
duty, he must contact the Sheriff's dispatcher. He must 
also contact the dispatcher to go back off-duty. The off-
duty use of County vehicles has been expanded and retracted 
at various times according to the availability of vehicles. 
On January 26, 1978, Deputy Sheriff David Mac Kelly had 
been off duty for several hours and had been drinking. At 
approximately 11:00 p.m., while driving a Salt Lake County 
vehicle, Deputy Kelly collided with Jeffrey Foster, a six-
teen year old boy pedestrian. Jeffrey Foster died as a 
result of the injuries received. 
Deputy Kelly was later terminated from the Sheriff's 
Department and convicted of automobile homicide. Jeffrey 
Foster's parents filed a wrongful death action against Deputy 
Kelly, Sheriff Delmar L. Larson, Vance L. Rex and Salt Lake 
County. Kelly contacted his private insurance carrier which 
sent a letter to the Salt Lake County Commission, with a copy 
of the Summons and Complaint, stating, "It would appear that 
your insurance applies." On March 23, 1978, the Salt Lake 
County Attorney's Office declined to represent Mr. Kelly on 
the ground that at the time of the accident he was not act-
ing within the course and scope of his employment. 
On January 4, 1979, the plaintiffs voluntarily dis-
missed defendants Larson, Vance and Salt Lake County from 
the lawsuit. Salt Lake County did not know at the time of 
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the dismissal that Kelly had secretly entered into an agree-
ment with plaintiffs whereby he agreed not to contest his 
negligence in causing the death of Jeffrey Foster. Kelly 
also agreed, as a part of this secret arrangement, to assign 
any cause of action he may have had against Salt Lake County 
to the Fosters, and Fosters agreed not to execute against 
Kelly's personal assets. 
On January 5, 1979, the day following the voluntary 
dismissal, plaintiffs presented their evidence in an un-
contested trial before Judge David K. Winder. Salt Lake 
County was not informed of this hearing and, of course, 
was not present. Judge Winder awarded a judgment against 
Kelly in the amount of $150,000.00. 
Plaintiffs then filed an action against Salt Lake 
County seeking a judgment declaring Salt Lake County to 
be liable to the plaintiffs in the amount of $100,000.QO. 
The case was set for a jury trial on June 28, 1979. 
The trial did not proceed as scheduled. Rather, Judge 
James s. Sawaya heard a Motion for Summary Judgment on 
the pleadings at that time. He granted Judgment against 
Salt Lake County in the amount of $150,000.00 (even though 
the Complaint only prayed for $100,000.00). A Motion to 
Amend the Complaint to increase the prayer to $150,000.00 
was later filed by plaintiffs and heard on August 9, 1979. 
-4-
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The Motion was denied on the basis that the Court lacked 
jurisdiction, a Notice of Appeal having already been filed. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE EXTENT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY'S LIA-
BILITY AS A "SELF-INSURER" IS LIMITED TO 
PAYMENT OF NO FAULT BENEFITS. 
A. Applicability Of Utah Automobile No Fault Provision. 
Prior to the adoption of the Utah Automobile No Fault 
Insurance Act in 1973, public entities were not required to 
carry public liability insurance. Section 41-12-33, U.C.A. 
1953 as amended, specifically exempted the United States, the 
State of Utah, or any of its political subdivisions, from the 
provisions of the Safety Responsibility Act. In 1973, how-
ever, the Legislature adopted the Utah Automobile No Fault 
Insurance Act, Section 31-41-1, et· seq., U.C.A. 1953 as 
amended, which provides in part as follows: 
The State of Utah and all of its political 
subdivisions and their respective departments, 
institutions, or agencies shall maintain in 
effect continuously in respect to their motor 
vehicles, the security provided for in Section 
31-41-5. 
The provisions of Section 31-41-5 provide two alterna-
tive methods whereby the required security can be provided. 
Subsection (a) authorizes security to be provided through an 
automobile insurance policy which qualifies under the Safety 
Responsibility Act. Subsection (b} permits security to be 
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provided "by any other method approved by the Department (of 
Insurance) as affording security equivalent to that offered 
by a policy of insurance." That subsection also states that 
the "person providing this type of security shall have all 
of the obligations and rights of an insurer under this act," 
i.e. Utah Automobile No Fault Insurance Act of 1973. 
In this case Salt Lake County provided security through 
the means of an annual tax levy from which judgments against 
the County could be paid. The Insurance Commissioner is 
empowered to issue a Certificate of Self-Insurance when he 
finds that an applicant qualifies under Section 31-41-5. ~ 
July 1, 1977, a Certificate of Self-Insurance was issued to 
Salt Lake County by the Insurance Department of the State of 
Utah. The Certificate is part of the record and a copy is 
attached to this Brief for the convenience of the Court. 
The Certificate in pertinent part, states as follows: 
THIS IS TO CERTIFY, that pursuant to the Insur-
ance Code of the State of Utah, Salt Lake County 
has complied with Section 31-41-5(1) (b) of the 
Utah Automobile No Fault Insurance Law and has 
qualified as a self-insurer. 
In order to determine the obligations of the self-
insurance which Salt Lake County assumed, it is necessary 
to refer to the No Fault Insurance Act. The limits of lia-
bility to the County are as set forth in the No Fault Act, 
which provides in detail the extent of benefits to which an 
-6-
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injured party may be entitled. By thus defining the bene-
fits, the limits of liability applicable to the public 
entity are clearly established. 
The method for providing security as approved by the 
Insurance Commissioner, i.e. the levy of taxes for the 
payment of judgments, and the establishment of coverage as 
provided in the No Fault Insurance Act, were properly found 
by the Insurance Commissioner to constitute a substantially 
equivalent security. To our knowledge neither the adequacy 
of the security nor the approval by the Insurance Commis-
sioner is challenged. 
The duties of a self-insurer under the No Fault Act 
are clearly established. As pointed out above Section 
31-41-5(1 )(b) provides that the party providing the alter-
nate type of security " ••• shall have all of the obliga-
tions and rights of an insurer •.. " under the No Fault 
Act. The obligations of an insurer under the Act, which 
constitute the terms of the policy, are set forth in detail 
in Section 31-41-6 (a copy of that statute is attached to 
the Appendix of this Brief). The language of the statute 
is significant: 
(1) Every insurance policy or other security 
complying with the requirements of Subsection 1 
of Section 31-41-5 shall provide personal in 
jury protection providing for paymen~s to the 
insured and all other persons suffering personal 
injury arising out of an accident involving a 
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~otor.vehicle~ except as otherwise provided 
in this Act, in at least the following minimum 
amounts. (emphasis added). 
(a) Medical benefits as defined; 
(b) Disability benefits as defined; 
(c) Funeral benefits as defined; 
(d) Survivor benefits as defined. 
Subsection (2) sets forth the manner in which the med~ 
cal expenses are to be determined and the remaining subsec-
tions further clarify the application of the section. 
Thus the "other security" approved by the Insurance 
Commissioner as qualifying a governmental entity to become 
a self-insurer under the No Fault Act, requires the entity 
to undertake the responsibilities of an insurer and become 
obligated to pay not only to the insured, but to "all other 
persons suffering personal injuries arising out of an acci-
dent involving a motor vehicle" owned by the political sub-
division, in "at least the minimum amounts," as specified in 
that Act. There is no dispute in this case that Salt Lake 
County has paid the benefits to the plaintiffs as required 
by this Act. 
B. Salt Lake County Is Not An Implied Insurer. 
Plaintiffs' claim that Salt Lake County is somehow an 
"implied" insurer of those operating its vehicles cannot be 
sustained by Utah law. 
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A contract of insurance is an agreement to answer for 
the debt of another. The statute of frauds specifically 
requires that such agreements are void unless written and 
subscribed as required by the provisions of Section 24-5-4, 
u.c.A. 1953, as amended. 
Further, the Legislature has even more specifically 
applied this rule in statutory form to the law of insurance 
contracts. Section 31-19-18, U.C.A. 1953 as amended provides: 
No insurer or its agent, nor any solicitor or 
broker shall make any contract of insurance or 
agreement as to such contract, other than as 
plainly expressed in the policy issued thereon. 
Any such understanding or agreement not so 
expressed shall be invalid. 
Plaintiffs claim that Kelly was party to an "implied 
contract" of insurance with Salt Lake County. The concept 
of "implied contract" is totally inapplicable to this ~itua-
tion. If any duty is owed here, it arises from a statutory 
duty imposed upon self-insurers. To imply duties not speci-
fied by the statute is to judicially amend the legislation 
which expressly deals with the subject matter. 
Although this case appears complex, it is actually 
quite simple. The statute (U.C.A. 31-41-5 (b)) says that a 
self-insurer has the obligations of an insurer under this 
~· "This act" is the no-fault act. The obligations of 
an insurer under the act are set out in U.C.A. 31-41-6 as 
payment of no-fault benefits. 
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The concept of "implied contract" is not involved in 
any way. 
The only liability which can be imposed upon Salt Lake 
County is through the provisions of the No Fault Insurance 
Act and then, only strictly in accordance with the provi-
sions of that law. 
C. Deputy Sheriff Kelly Did Not Seek Indemnifi-
cation By Salt Lake County Under The Indem-
nification Of Public Officers And Employees 
Act And No Rights Have Arisen Thereunder. 
Salt Lake County is required under specific conditions 
to indemnify its employees under the provisions of the Inde~ 
nification of Public Officers and Employees' Act, Section 
63-48-1, et seq., U.C.A. 1953, as amended. However, neither 
the Deputy Sheriff nor the plaintiffs are seeking any reco-
very under this statute. In fact, upon the representation 
that recovery was not sought under that section, the trial 
court granted the plaintiffs' Motion to Strike certain 
defenses based upon that statute. The order of the trial 
court is quoted with reference to that matter as follows: 
[T]he Public Officers and Employees Indemnifica-
tion laws are not involved in this controversy and 
have no bearing on the judgment and order which is 
hereby entered. 
Although the legislature has specifically provided this 
method of employee indemnification, plaintiffs have chosen to 
ignore the statute or seek recovery outside its provisions. 
-10-
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Because the plaintiffs do not base their theory of 
recovery upon the indemnification statute, there is no legal 
basis which will support a claim of indemnity. They do not 
claim that Kelly was operating the Salt Lake County vehicle 
in the course of his employment; they do not claim that Salt 
Lake County is liable under a theory of negligent entrustment; 
they do not claim breach of any statutory duty; and they do 
not even claim an express (although unwritten) agreement to 
indemnify Kelly. Clearly plaintiffs claim of an "implied 
insurance contract" is without any legal foundation. 
POINT II 
THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT SALT 
LAKE COUNTY IS BOUND BY THE JUDGMENT 
AGAINST DEPUTY KELLY. 
A. There Is No Legal Basis By Which The Trial 
Court Could Enforce The Judgment Against 
Deputy Kelly Upon Salt Lake County. 
Plaintiffs Foster do not claim against Salt Lake County 
directly. Rather they claim as assignees of Kelly's claim 
against the County. 
As discussed above, any legal basis for imposing 
the judgment against Kelly upon Salt Lake County is wholly 
lacking. There is no claim that Salt Lake County is bound 
by Kelly's acts under the doctrine of Respondeat Superior. 
There is no claim that Salt Lake County is liable under the 
Indemnification statute, and there is no claim that provi-
-11-
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sions of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act somehow imposes 
liability against the County. 
But even if such a legal basis existed, the judgment 
against Kelly could not be imposed upon Salt Lake County for 
the following reasons: 
1. The Judgment Was Based Upon Collusion. 
Even if Salt Lake County were somehow bound by the judg-
ment against the Deputy, it is unenforceable because it is 
collusive. The lawsuit against Deputy David Mac Kelly (Civil 
No. C-78-1377) originally included Salt Lake County as a de-
fendant. Deputy Salt Lake County Attorney, Ralph D. Crockett, 
was assigned to defend the case. His Affidavit asserts that 
on January 3, 1978, he received a telephone call from the 
plaintiff's attorney, Carman E. Kipp. Mr. Kipp indicated 
that his intention was to secure a judgment against David 
Mac Kelly and then to pursue his claim against his client's 
uninsured motorist carrier. Upon this representation, Mr. 
Crockett agreed to a voluntary dismissal. (Record, 205-207). 
Mr. Crockett did not know, and Mr. Kipp did not tell him, 
that on December 12, 1978, the plaintiffs had entered into 
a stipulation with David Mac Kelly whereby Kelly consented 
to allow plaintiffs to proceed with a non-jury trial wherein 
Kelly would not contest the issue of negligence and liabilitY· 
(Id.). Secondly, Kelly agreed to assign any right he may 
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have against Salt Lake County to the plaintiffs. Thirdly, 
plaintiffs agreed not to execute upon any personal assets of 
Kelly, but instead to pursue their claims against Salt Lake 
county only. Further, the plaintiffs agreed that after two 
years, or the conclusion of any litigation against Salt Lake 
County, the judgment would be released and satisfied against 
Kelly. This document is part of the record in Foster v. 
Kelly, Civil No. C-79-1377. The trial court took judicial 
notice of the entire contents of that file. A copy of the 
Stipulation is attached to this Brief for the convenience of 
the Court. 
On January 4, 1979, Ralph Crockett signed a Stipulation 
for an Order of Dismissal without prejudice. The trial was 
scheduled to begin January 29, 1979, and Mr. Crockett in-
tended to attend. A special trial setting for January 5, 
1979, was arranged by plaintiffs' counsel for the day follow-
ing the signing of the Stipulation. Mr. Crockett was not 
informed of the trial setting. At that hearing the plain-
tiffs presented their evidence. Although Deputy Kelly was 
represented by counsel, no evidence was presented to rebut 
any of the plaintiffs' contentions. 
After plaintiffs' closing argument the court asked 
Kelly's attorney, "Do you wish to respond?" Kelly's attor-
ney responded, "I have no statement." (Exhibit 13, p.19). 
-13-
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No objections were made to any of plaintiffs' evidence, 
None of the plaintiffs' witnesses were cross-examined. The 
Court entered a judgment against Kelly in the amount of 
$150,000.00. 
Although this Court held in the case of Plewe Construe-
tion Company v. Franklin National Ins. Co., 11 Utah 2d 403, 
360 P.2d 599 (1961): 
[W]here an insured such as Plewe sues its insurer 
for reimbursement under liability policy, the 
judgment against the insured in the prior action 
is conclusive against it as to the facts found 
therein, even though the insurer (Franklin) was 
not a party to the first suit, nor do we question 
the above rule applies to judgments by confession. 
The authority for this statement as cited by the Court 
in 46 C.J.S. Insurance, §1251 at p. 260 acknowledges the 
following exception: 
The rule does not apply ••• •where fraud or 
collusion on the part of, or between the parties 
to the prior action ••• is shown. (emphasis 
added). 
"Collusion" has been judicially defined as: 
••• a corrupt agreement between the parties 
to impose a case on the court, either by the 
suppression of evidence or the manufacture 
thereof, as well as an agreement that no defense 
shall be made. (emphasis added). 
Neu v. Neu, 297 Mich. 654, 298 N.W. 318, 320 (1941). 
The fact that the attorney presented no evidence and 
questioned no witnesses is strong indication of an agreement 
that no defense be made. 
-14-
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In Curb and Gutter District No. 37 v. Parrish, 110 F.2d 
902, 907 (8th Cir. 1940) the Court said: 
It is generally recognized that collusion in 
law embraces either a fictitious or assumed 
state of facts in order to obtain a judicial 
determination. 
This is precisely the case now before the Court. The 
parties agreed to secure a judicial determination solely 
for the purpose of imposing liability on Salt Lake County. 
Apart from the issue of liability, the factual question of 
damages was substantial, but remained uncontested. Dismis-
sing Salt Lake County was merely a ploy to avoid opposition 
in the lawsuit. The judgment rendered ($150,000.00) is 
several times the highest wrongful death verdict for an 
unmarried minor child previously rendered in the State of 
Utah. This in itself is an indication that the parties 
based their claim of damages upon a false or assumed state 
of facts. The result itself fails to sustain good faith. 
The fact that there had been a previous stipulation 
between Kelly and the plaintiffs under the circumstances is 
evidence of collusion. This evidence is strengthened by the 
fact that the Salt Lake County Attorney was not told of the 
stipulation, nor was he informed of the trial date, so that 
he could be present. The Affidavit of Ralph Crockett indi-
cates that he was told by the attorney for the plaintiffs 
that his intention was to pursue uninsured motorist coverage. 
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The players were merely being positioned to use the court 
process to establish a judgment, uncontested and not sup-
ported by fact, for the sole purpose of imposing it upon 
the County. The County was simply misled in agreeing to a 
voluntary dismissal. 
2. The Issue Of Collusion Was A Genuine One 
Which Precluded The Granting Of Summary 
Judgment. 
The issue of collusion is a serious one, going to the 
very heart of the j ud ic ial process. The evidence of collu-
sive conduct springs from the failure to accurately advise 
Salt Lake County of the real reason for requesting a Volun-
tary Dismissal. Had this been done, a stipulated dismissal 
would not have been made and the issues of damage would have 
been fully tested. 
Prior to the hearing before Judge Sawaya, the plaintiffs 
moved for an order striking the defense based on collusion. 
This was denied by Judge Durham in her Memorandum Decision 
of June 6, 1979, where she said there was a "material iss~ 
of fact regarding the good faith nature of the defense ef-
forts in the earlier lawsuit." Nevertheless the trial co~t 
in granting a summary judgment disregarded this finding, but 
the issue remains. It is a proper jury issue. 
The judicial system must not be distorted under the 
guise of procedure, so as to defeat justice and fair dealing. 
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The blind mistress is not so unseeing as to permit the 
scales of justice to be so unfairly tipped by the unseen 
finger of a litigant. 
B. Even under a Standard Liability Insurance 
Policy The Insurer Would Not Be Bound By 
The Judgment Against Deputy Kelly. 
Plaintiffs seek the best of all possible worlds by 
basing their lawsuit on the theory that Salt Lake County 
is an "implied insurer" of Deputy Kelly. Since there is no 
written contract, however, the plaintiffs claim they are not 
bound by any maximum limitations or by any of the provisions 
that would ordinarily be found in a standard liability policy. 
But even under a standard liability policy, the provisions of 
such a policy would forbid the enforcement of this stipulated 
judgment upon the insurer. 
The requirements of a standard policy under the Safety 
Responsib i1 ity Act include: 
41-12-21 (b) (2) • • . Such owner's policy 
of liability insurance shall insure ••• against 
loss from the liability imposed by law for damages 
arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use 
of said motor vehicle. 
All standard liability policies use similar language re-
quiring the insurer to "pay all sums which the insured shall 
become legally obligated to pay" or insuring "against loss 
from the 1 iabil ity imposed by law for damages. n 
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The insurer, therefore, is required to make payment only 
if the insured would be legally obligated to pay where liabi-
lity is imposed upon the insured for damages. 
The stipulation between Kelly and plaintiffs in this 
case provided: 
5. Plaintiffs agree and covenant that they 
will not execute against the defendant upon such 
judgment in any manner or proceeding other than 
against Salt Lake County or any insurance company 
affording liability coverage to the defendant at 
the time and place alleged in plaintiffs' first 
cause of action. The judgment will be released 
and satisfied by the plaintiffs upon the conclu-
sion or compromise of all actions and proceedings 
against any insurance companies and/or Salt Lake 
County; however, said release and satisfaction of 
said judgment is to occur at the end of two years 
from the date of entry of judgment herein, unless 
at that time there is pending in any court of law 
an action by plaintiff against any insurance com-
pany or Salt Lake County wherein plaintiff alleges 
that said company or Salt Lake County owed a duty 
to indemnify defendant or that it afforded liabi-
lity coverage to the defendant at the time and 
place alleged in the first cause of action of plain-
tiffs' complaint herein, in that event said judgment 
will be released and satisfied upon the conclusion 
or compromise of said pending action or actions. 
Obviously, in this case, the plaintiffs have no legal 
right to recover damages against Kelly. Consequently, an 
ordinary insurance carrier under a standard pol icy or under 
an approved policy under the Safety Responsibility Act, 
would not be obligated to the plaintiffs. 
A similar case is Huffman v. Peerless Ins. Co., 193 
s.E. 2d 773 (N.C. 1973). In that case the stipulation read 
as follows: 
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j 
a~. 
(T]hat the plaintiff shall have recovery 
of the defendant Roby Daniel Johnson, the sum of 
$20,000.00, but this judgment shall not be a lien 
upon any property owned or to be owned in the 
future by the defendant Roby Daniel Johnson and 
this judgment shall not be the basis upon which 
execution can issue against any property of the 
defendant Roby Daniel Johnson, at present or in 
the future •••• 
That the plaintiff shall mark this judgment 
"Satisfied in Full as to Principal, Interest and 
Costs" after collecting all of the insurance 
policies available to the defendant Roby Daniel 
Johnson for the accident giving rise to this 
action ••• 
The trial court granted a summary judgment and the 
appeals court affirmed, holding: 
Obviously, under the terms of the consent 
judgment, John Daniel Johnson and Roby Daniel 
Johnson were not legally obligated to pay dam-
ages to plaintiff. 
Similarly in this case, Deputy Kelly is not legally obli-
gated to pay damages to the plaintiffs. An ordinary insurer 
would, therefore, not be obligated to plaintiffs. Plaintiffs 
cannot claim that Salt Lake County is an "implied insurer" 
taking the benefits of being an insured, while ignoring the 
limitations and requirements of a standard policy. 
The purpose of requiring that the insurance company 
pay only damages that the insured would be legally obligated 
to pay is to prevent this very kind of thing: a collusive 
agreement between the insured and a third party that is made 
solely for the purpose of imposing liability on the insurer. 
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POINT III 
PLAINTIFFS HAVE FAILED TO COMPLY WITH THE 
UTAH GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT. 
A. Immunity Has Not Been Waived For An Action 
Of This Nature. 
Salt Lake County, as a governmental entity, is immune 
from suit for money damages, except as immunity is waived~ 
the Utah Governmental Immunity Act. 
Except as may be otherwise provided in this 
act, all governmental entities shall be immune 
from suit for any injury which may result from 
the activities of said entities wherein said en-
tity is engaged in the exercise and discharge of 
a governmental function. 
Utah Code Ann. §63-30-3 (1953 as amended). 
The Act waives immunity from suit for injuries arisi~ 
from an automobile accident, if the governmental employee was 
operating the vehicle while in the scope of his employment. 
Section 63-30-7 provides: 
Immunity from suit of all governmental 
entitites is waived for injury resulting from 
the negligent operation by any employee of a 
motor vehicle or other equipment while in the 
scope of his employment ••• (emphasis added). 
The plaintiffs initially relied upon the Governmental 
Immunity Act to establish liability, and plead in their com-
plaint that Kelly was in the course and scope of his duties 
with Salt Lake County (Record 2). However, no evidence was 
presented that Kelly was within the scope of his employ~~ 
at the time of the accident. In fact, plaintiffs abandoo~ 
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their claim under the indemnification statute which would 
have also required them to show that Kelly was acting within 
the scope of his employment. The plaintiffs have totally 
failed to establish liability against the county under the 
Governmental Immunity Act. 
B. In Any Event, the Governmental Immunity Act 
Limits Recovery to a Maximum of $100,000.00. 
In those cases filed against the County, which are 
authorized by the Governmental Immunity Act, the limit of 
recovery is $100,000.00 per injury or death to one person, 
unless applicable commercial insurance provides greater 
~verage. Utah Code Ann. §63-30-34 (1953 as amended). Even 
if this suit were authorized under the Act, the trial court 
was without power to enter a judgment of $150,000.00. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiffs' theory of recovery in this case is that 
Salt Lake County is an "implied insurer" of its vehicles and 
those who use them with the permission of Salt Lake County, 
whether or not the user of the vehicle is within the course 
and scope of employment. The Utah law is clear that an "im-
0ied contract of insurance" cannot legally exist in this 
state. Insurance contracts must be in writing and their 
terms clearly specified. It is clear that there was no such 
nitten document here. Salt Lake County fulfilled its duty 
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as a self-insurer by paying no fault benefits pursuant to 
the Utah Automobile No Fault Insurance Act. 
In any event, the question as to whether Salt Lake 
County is bound by the previous judgment should have been 
sent to the jury because of a genuine issue of material fact 
existed as to collusion between the plaintiffs and David M~ 
Kelly. 
Finally, even in the event that Salt Lake County is 
considered an insurer under some theory, it cannot be bound 
by the judgment against Kelly since an ordinary insurer under 
a standard pol icy would not be bound. An insurer would only 
be required to respond if Kelly himself were legally obli-
gated to pay damages. Obviously, this is not the case here. 
Respectfully submitted this __ day of November, 1979. 
TED CANNON, SALT LAKE 
COUNTY ATTORNEY 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINE~ 
<:..___ '""' B~~a.}\ 
Merlin R. Lybbert 
By < _:> ~ ,(c:tl {~\i;,~ -
Scott Daniels .. , 
Attorneys for De fend ant-Appel." 
Salt Lake County 
700 Continental Bank Buildin~ 
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Mailed two copies of the foregoing Brief of 
Appellants to Carmen E Kipp of Kipp and Christian, attorneys 
for respondents, 600 Commercial Club Bldg., Salt Lake City, 
Utah 84111, postage prepaid, this 29th day of November, 1979. 
Scott Daniels 
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State of Utah Insurance Department 
NO. 1014 
Self Insurance Certificate 
This ZS to certify, That, pursuant lo the Insurance Code or the State 
of Utah, 
SALT LAKE COUNTY 
has complied with Section 31-41-5 (lb) or the Utah Automobile No-Fault Insurance Law 
and has qualified as a Self Insurer. 
This Certzfica te remains at all times the propeny or the State or Utah 
and if suspended, revoked, or otherwise terminated, shall forthwith be returned to the 
Insurance Department of the State or Utah. 
Jn Witness Whereof. effective as or the_l ST __ day 
or JULY , 19 _1L, I have hereunto 
set my hand and caused my official seal to be affixed 
this --1!!!._ day or .....;;J...:;U.=.L ¥,;..__ ___ , 19 Jl__. 
---------~co,..M1ss10N&11t OLI' INsUiitANC~ 
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Citation of act. 
J 
Purpose of act-Property damage claims not afrected. 
Definition of terms. 
Requirement for maintenance of security by residents, nonreai· 
dents, state of Utah and poHHcal subdivisions, United States, 
and other states or political subdivisions. 
Insurance or other se4urity authorized-Inaurance coverage!!! 
greater than required minimum allowed. 
Minimum benefits-Determination of reasonable value of medical 
expenses-Medical expenses include nonmedieal remedial eare 
and treatment in accordance with religious method-Deductible 
amounts allowed.• 
Personal injuries covered-Primary coverage-Reduction of bene~ 
lits. 
Payment of benefits-Time limit-Action for overdue benefits and 
tnterest. 
Limitations on tort actiona-Liability of non·covered owner. 
Exclusions from coverage. 
Subrogation rights and arbitration between insurers. 
Ru1es and regulations ot department. 
Operation of vehicle without 1ecurlty a misdemeanor-PosseHion 
of evidence of security required-Additional penalties-Pro-
cedures following conviction or arrest for vio1ation. 
Authority of political aubWvisions to adopt ordinances and reg-
ulations consistent with act. 
31-41-1. Citation of act.-This act shall be known and may be cited as 
the "Utah Automobile No-Fault Insurance Act." 
History: L. 1973, ch. 55, § 1. 
Title Of Act. 
An act relating to antomobi1es and 
personal injuries resulting from accidents 
involving them; requiring motor vehicle 
owners to provide certain prescribed se-
curity in respect to these injuries on a 
no.fault basis; prescribing the benefits to 
b(' paid on this basis; providing the pro-
cedures reg-:1rding payment of these bene-
fits; pro>iding for limitations on tort 
11.dions involving automobile accidents; 
providing penalties for non-coverage and 
for exclusions from coverage; providing 
for subrogation and arbitration between 
insurers; providing for limited coordina-
tion between benefits from other insur-
ances; and providing an effective date.-
L. 1973, ch. 55. 
Comparable Provisions. 
Jurisdictions that have adopted an 
Automobile No-Fault Insurance Act in-
875 
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AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE Sl-41-5 
_31-41-4. Requirement for maintenance of security by residents, non-
residents, state of Utah and political subdivisions, United States, and other 
states or political subdivisions.-(1) Enry resident o'vner of a motor 
vehicle shall maintain the security proYided for in section 31-41-5 in effect 
continuously throughout the registration period of the motor vehicle. 
(2) EYery nonresident owner of a motor vehicle which has been 
physically present in this state for more than ninety days during the pre-
ceding 365 days shall thereafter maintain the security provided for in 
section 31-41-5 in effect continuously throughout the period the motor 
\'ehicle remains 'vithin this state. 
(3) The state of Utah and all of its political subdivisions and their 
rcspecti,·e departments, institutions, or agencies shall maintain in eft'ect 
continuously in respect to their motor vehicles the security provided for in 
section 31-41-5. 
(4) The United States and any other state, or any political subdi,·i-
sions of same, or any of their agencies, may maintain in effect in respect 
to their motor vehicles the security provided for in section 31-41-5. 
History: L. 1973, ch. 66, § L 7 Am. Jur. 2d 297, Automobile Insur-
Cross-Reference. 
Safety Responsibility Act, security re-
quired, 41-12·5. 
CoUateral B.ererences. 
A utomobileo~l'4.1 (4 ). 
60 C.J.S. Motor Vehieleo § llO. 
ance § 4. 
Validitv and eonetruC"tion of "no-fault" 
nutomobiie lnourance piano, 42 A. L. B. Id 
~29. 
Validity of Motor Vehicle Finanrial Re· 
oponoibility Act, 35 A. L. R. 2d 1011. 
31-41-5. Insurance or other security authorized-Insurance coverages 
greater than required minimum allowed.-(!) The security required by 
this act shall be prol"ided in one of the following methods: 
(a) Security by insurance may be provided with respect to each 
motor nhicle by an insurance policy that qualifies under chapter 12 of 
Title 41 (the Safety Responsibility Act), except as modified to provide the 
benefits and exemptions provided for in tliis act, and has bePn approved 
by the department; or 
(b) Security may be provided with respect to any motor vehicle by 
any other method approved by the department as affording security equiva-
lent to that offered by a policy of insurance provided such security is 
continuously maintained throughout the motor vehicle's registration period. 
The person providing this type of security shall have all of the obliga-
tions and rights of an insurer under this act. 
(2) l\'othing contained in this act shall be construed to prohibit the 
issuance of policies of insurance providing coverages greater than the 
minimum coYerages required under this act nor to require the segregation , ' 
of such minimum conrages from other coYerages in the same policy. 
History: L. 1973, ch. 65, § 5. Validity and con1truction of "no-fault" 
automobile insurance plane, 4.2 A. L. R. 
Collateral B.eferences. 3d 229. 
Automobiles~43. Validity of Motor Vehicle Financial 
60 C.J.S Motor Vehicl., § 113. Responsibility Act, 35 A. L. R. 2d 1011. 
7 Am. Jur. 2d 297, Automobile In:rnr-
an('e § 5. 
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AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE 81-41-7 
the relative 'l"alue study. If a service or accommodation is not assigned a 
unit value or median charge under the relative value study, the value of 
the service or accommodation shall equal the reasonable cost of tbP. same 
or similar service or accommodation in the most populous county of this 
state. Kotbing herein shall preclude the department from adopting a sched-
ule already established if it meets the requirement of this subsection. 1n 
disputed cases, a court on its own motion or the motion of either party 
may designate an impartial medical panel of not more than three licensed 
physicians to examine the claimant and testify on the issue of the reason-
able value of their medical expenses. 
(3) Medical expenses as pro'l"ided for in subsection (1) of this section 
and in subsection (1) (e) of section 31-41-9 shall include expenses for any 
nonmedical remedial care and treatment rendered in accordance with a 
recognized religious method of healing. 
( 4) At appropriately reduced premium rates insurers ruay offer de-
ductibles in amounts not exceeding $500 per accident in respect to the 
insurance coverages required by this act applicable, bowe'l"er, only to 
claims of the insured. 
(5) Kothing contained in this act shall be construed to prohibit an 
insurance policy from providing coverage for any nonmedical remedial 
treatment rendered in accordance with a recognized religious method of 
healing. 
History: L. 1973, ch. 66, § 6. 
Collateral References. 
lnsuranceG=>ll.l. 
44 C.J.S. lneurance § 64. 
7 Am. Jur. 2d 298, Automobile lnour· 
l.DCO § 6. 
31-41-7. Personal injuries covered-Primary coverage-Reduction of 
benefits.-(1) The coverages describe.a in section 31-41-6 shall be ap-
plicable to: 
, (a) Personal injuries sustained by the insured when injured in an 
accident in this state im·olving any motor vehicle. 
(b) Personal injuries arising out of automobile accidents occurring 
iu this state sustained by any other natural person while occupying the 
described motor nbicle with the consent of the insured or while a pedes-
trian if injured in an accident involving the described motor vehicle. 
(2) When a person injured is also an insured party under any other 
policy, including those complying with this act, primary coverage shall 
, be afforded by tbe policy insuring the motor vehicle out of the use of 
which the accident arose. 
(3) The benefits payable to any injured person under section 31-41-6 
sh all be reduced by: 
(a) Any benefits which that person receives or is entitled to receive 
as a result of an accident covered in this act under any workmen's com· 
pensation plan or any similar statutory plan; and 
(b) Any amounts which that person receives or is entitled to receive 
from the United States or any of its agencies because of military enlist-
ment, duty or service. 
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AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE 31-41-13 
31-41-10. Exclusions from coverage.-Any insurer may exclude benefits: 
(a) (i) For injury sustained by the injured while occupying another 
motor vehicle owned by the insured and not insured under the policy or 
(ii) for an injury sustained by any person while operating the ins~red 
motor vel1icle without the express or implied consent of the insured or 
while not iu lawful possession of the insured motor vehicle. 
(h) To any injured person, if such person's conduct contributed to 
his iujury under any of the following circumstances: 
(i) Causing injury to himself intentionally; or 
(ii) While committing a felony. 
History: L. 1973, ch. 65, § 10. 
31-41-11. Subrogation rights and arbitration between insurers.-(1) 
E,·ery iusurer authorized to write the insurance required by this act shall 
agree as a condition to being allowed to continue to write insurance in the 
state of Utah: 
(a) That where its insured is or \'l"ould be held legally liable for the 
personal injuries sustained by any person to whom benefits required under 
this act have been paid by another insurer, including the state insurance 
ru;a;-it will reimburse such other insurer for the payment of such bene-
fits, but not in excess of the amount of damages so recovera~, and 
(b) That the issue of liability for such reimbursement and the amount 
of same shall be decided by mandatory, bin<lin~ arbitration between the 
insurers. 
History: L. 1973, ch. 65, § 11. 
Compiler's Notes. 
Seetion 11 of Laws 19i3, ch. 55, does 
not contain a subsection (2). 
Collateral References. 
Insuranee~4.1. 
44 C.J .S. Insurance § 64. 
See Am. Jur. 2d, No-Fault lnsuranr>e 
§§ 1-34, when published. 
Validity and construction ot 0 no-fau1t" 
nutomobile in1urance plan1, 42 A. L. R. 
3d 229. 
Law Reviews. 
No-Fault Automobile Insurance in Utah 
-State Constitutional Issues, 1970 Utah 
L. Rev. 248. 
Compensation Systems and Utah's No-
Fault Statute, 1973 Utah L. Rev. 383. 
.Countrywide O\"eTYiew of Automobile 
No-Fault Insurance, 23 Defense L. J. 443 
(197'1). 
31-41-12. Rules and regulations of department.-The department is 
authorized to promulgate such rules and regulations as may be necessary 
for the purposes of this act. 
History: L. 1973, ch. 65, § 12. Cross-Reference. 
Rules and regulations, 
commissioner, 31-2-3.5. 
nuthority of 
81-41-13. Operation of vehicle without security a misdemeanor-Posses-
sion of evidence of security required-Additional penalties-Procedures 
following conviction or arrest for violation.-(1) Any owner of a motor 
vehicle with respect to which a security is required under this act, who 
operates this vehicle or permits it to be operated on a public highway in 
this state without this security being in effect is guilty of a misdemeanor. 
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AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE 31-41-13.4 
immediately before a magistrate or city judge as provided in sections 
77-13-17 or 78-4-16.5 if: 
(i) The person arrested demands an immediate appearance before a 
magistrate or judge; or 
(ii) The person arrested refuses to give bis written promise to appear 
in court as provided in subsection (5) of this section or, when in the dis-
cretion of the arresting officer, a written promise to appear is insufficient. 
(5) (a) Upon any violation of this act punishable as a misdemeanor, 
whenever a person is not immediately taken before a magistrate or judge 
as provided in subsection (4) of this section, the peace officer shall prepare 
in triplicate or more copies a written notice to appear in court containing 
the name and address of the person, the number, if any, of bis operator's or 
chauffeur's license, the registration number of his motor vehicle, the offense 
charged, and the time and place when and where such person shall appear 
in court. 
(b) The time specified in the notice to appear must be at least five 
days after the arrest unless the person arrested demands an earlier hearing. 
(c) The place specified in the notice to appear must be made before a 
magistrate or judge within the county in which the offense charged is 
alleged to have been committed and who has jurisdiction of the offense. 
( d) The arrested person, in order to secure release as provided in this 
subsection (5) (d), must give his written promise satisfactory to the arrest-
ing officer so to appear in court by signing at least one copy of the written 
notice prepared by the arresting officer. The officer shall deliver a copy of 
the notice to the person promising to appear, and the officer shall then re-
lease the person arrested from custody. 
History: L. 1973, ch. 65, § 13; 1974, ch. 
10, § 1. 
Compiler's Notes. 
The 1974 amendment redesignated for-
mer eubeec. (3) •• subd. (3) (•); !Deerted 
"of a motor vehicle" near the end of 
ouhd. (3) (a); added oubds. (3) (b) and 
(3) (c); and added subsecs. (4) and (5). 
SeparabWty Olause. 
Section 14 of Lawe 1973, eh. 65 pro-
't'ided: "If any pro"rision of this act, or 
the application o! any provision to any 
penon or circumstance, ia 
the remaiDder of this act 
a!t:ected thereby." 
held invalid, 
shall not be 
Elt:ectlve Date. 
Section 15 of Laws 1973, ch. 55 pro· 
vided: "This act ahall take e!t:ect on 
January l, 1974." 
Collateral Jl.eferences_ 
Automobilesc=>lH.2(7). 
60 C.J.S. Motor Vehicles§ 164.18. 
7 Am. Jur. 2d 695, Automobile• 
Highway Trallic § 137. 
and 
31-41-13.4. Authority of political subdivisions to adopt ordinances 
and regulations consistent with act.-The provisions of this act shall be 
applied uniformly throughout the state and in all municipalities and o~her 
political subdivisions. Local authorities, however, may adopt regulations 
or ordinances consistent with this act and additional traffic regulations 
which are not in conflict with this act. 
History; C. 1953, 31-41-13.4, enacted by 
L. 1974, ch. 10, § 2. 
Title or Act. 
An act arnending the Utah Automobile 
No-Fault Insurance Act by ameDding sec-
tion 31-41·13, Utah Code Annotated 1953, 
as enacted by chapter 55, Laws of Utah 
1973 and enacting 1ection 31-41-13.4, 
Utah Code Annotated 1953; relating to 
penalties for violation of this act; spec-
ifying the procedures to be followed upon 
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W. BRENT WILCOX, of 
l'JOYLE & DRAPER 
""o"Ntvs ro" Defendant Kelly 
600 OC~lRLT .. ~AZA 
MO IS (.AST r1R:S'T SOUTH 
S"LT L"KE CITY, UT"H 8'4111 
'tClf.,.1o10-.i[ 1eo11 •t•-OISO 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
MRS. HERHAN FOSTER and JOHN ) 
EWINr,, natural parents of ) 
Jeffrey Adrian Ewing, aka ) 
Jeffrey Ewing Foster, deceased, ) 






DAVID tlAC KELLY, DELMAR L. ) 
LJ\RSON, REX L. VANCE, SALT ) 
LAKE COUNTY, a body corporate ) 






Civil No. C-78-1377 
;{HIS AC.REJMENT is made and ente<ed into this JL-.tl 
LJerenthe"°' , 1978, between MRS. HERMAN day of 
FOSTE~ and JOHN EWINr,, parents and natural guardians of 
JEFFREY ADRIAN EWING, aka JEFFREY EWING FOSTER, a minor, 
and DAVID MAC KELLY, all of Salt Lake County, Utah. 
WHEREAS, the parties to this Agreement are parties 
in a suit pending in the District Court of Salt Lake County, 
State of.Utah, Civil No. C-78-1377; and 
W!IEREAS, plaintiffs have asserted claims against 
defendant David Kelly alleging that his negligent and reckless 
operation of a ~otor vehicle caused the death of their son 
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L 
(3) That upon entry of judgment herein, plaintiffs 
will attempt to obtain satisfaction of said judgment from 
Salt Lake County who afforded liability coverage as a self-
insurer to the defendant David Mac Kelly for the acts and 
omissions alleged in plaintiffs' First Cause of Action. 
(4) That David Mac Kelly agrees to and does hereby 
assign to llrs. Herman Foster and Mr. John Ewing all rights 
to indemnification, except for recovery of his attorney's 
fees, which he may have in connection with any judgment they 
obtain, including but not limited to his rights against the 
self-insurance program and funds of Salt Lake County and 
his rights under any insurance contracts. 
(5) Plaintiffs agree and covenant that they will 
not execute against the defendant upon said judgment in any 
manner or proceeding other than against Salt Lake County or 
any insurance companies affording liability coverage to the 
defendant at the time and place alleged in plaintiffs' First 
Cause of Action. The judgment will be released and satisfied 
by the plaintiffs upon the conclusion or compromise of all 
actions and proceedings against said insurance companies 
and/or Salt Lake County: however, said release and satisfaction 
of said judgment is to occur at the end of two years from the 
date of entry of judgment herein unless at that time there is 
pending in any court of law an actio? by plaintiff against 
any insurance company or Salt Lake County wherein plaintiff 
alleges that said company or Salt Lake County owed a duty to 
indemnify defendant or that it afforded liability coverage to 
the defendant at the time and place alleged in the First Cause 
of Action of plaintiffs' complaint herein and in that event 
said judgment will be released and satisfied upon.the conclusion 
or compromise of said pending action or actions. 
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(9) This Agreement contains the entire agreement 
between the parties and is binding on their heirs and 
assigns. 
DATED and signed the day and year first above 
written. 
WITNESS: 




Attorneys for Defendant 
David Mac Kelly 
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